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The biological attacks with powders containing Bacillus anthracis sent through the mail during September
and October 2001 led to unprecedented public health and law enforcement investigations, which involved
thousands of investigators from federal, state, and local agencies. Following recognition of the first cases
of anthrax in Florida in early October 2001, investigators from the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were mobilized to assist investigators from state
and local public health and law enforcement agencies. Although public health and criminal investigations
have been conducted in concert in the past, the response to the anthrax attacks required close collabora-
tion because of the immediate and ongoing threat to public safety. We describe the collaborations between
CDC and FBI during the investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks and highlight the challenges and suc-
cesses of public health and law enforcement collaborations in general.
ublic health and law enforcement agencies become
involved in the investigation of a possible bioterrorism
event under different circumstances. Such events fall into one
of two categories: overt and covert. In the overt event, the per-
petrator announces responsibility for something (for example,
release of an agent) or the nature of the event reveals itself
(i.e., the 1995 sarin attack by the Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo
subway). In the overt attack, usually law enforcement first
detects the event, leads the initial response, and notifies public
health officials (Figure 1). If persons are ill or preventive
health services are indicated, public health will also become
involved in the emergency response. 
In contrast, the covert event is characterized by an unan-
nounced or unrecognized release in which the presence of ill
persons may be the first sign of an attack. In the covert attack,
criminal intent may not be apparent until some time after ill-
nesses are recognized. This distinction is important for estab-
lishing and understanding the partnership between public
health and law enforcement. The overt event is clearly a crime,
and the site of the incident is a crime scene. As a result, access
to the area may be restricted so that evidence can be collected
pursuant to the criminal investigation. Under federal statute
(Title 18, U.S.C. Section 2332[a]), any threatened use of a dis-
ease-causing organism directed at humans, animals, or plants
is a crime, regardless of whether the perpetrator actually pos-
sesses a disease-causing agent. In addition, as a result of a
change in the Bioterrorism Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act con-
tained in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and codified in Title
18 USC Section 175(b), knowingly possessing a biological
agent, toxin, or delivery system which cannot be “justified by
a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peace-
ful purpose” can result in arrest, prosecution, and fines and/or
imprisonment for up to 10 years. This new provision shifts the
burden of proof onto the person or persons who are in posses-
sion of dangerous biological agents to prove they have the
material for legitimate purposes. 
The covert event may not be initially recognized as an
attack, and public health generally first recognizes the problem
and leads the initial inquiry (Figure 2). The early response will
focus on diagnosis, medical care, and epidemiologic investiga-
tion. The intentional and criminal nature of the event may not
be immediately evident, and notification of law enforcement
may be delayed as a result. A 1985 outbreak of gastroenteritis
in Oregon that was caused by a religious cult contaminating
multiple salad bars with salmonella was initially thought to be a
natural event (1). The crime was only recognized after the
cult’s leader accused other cult members of the attack and pub-
licly called for an investigation. The subsequent criminal inves-
tigation confirmed the role of cult members in the outbreak. 
Microbiologic factors may also provide the first clue of the
criminal intent of a disease outbreak. In 1996, an outbreak of
gastroenteritis among staff in the laboratory of a large medical
center was caused by Shigella dysenteriae type 2, a pathogen
that is unusual in the United States (2). An epidemiologic
investigation linked infection with eating pastries that had
been placed in the laboratory break room. S. dysenteriae type 2
matching the laboratory’s stock strain by pulsed-field gel elec-
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trophoresis was recovered from ill laboratory workers and
from an uneaten pastry. A portion of the laboratory’s stock
strains was missing, and subsequent criminal investigation
identified a disgruntled former laboratory employee as the
perpetrator. 
The anthrax attacks in September and October 2001 pro-
vide examples of both overt and covert events and highlight the
different ways that public health and law enforcement agencies
become involved in investigating bioterrorist attacks. The first
case that was recognized in Florida in early October could have
represented a natural event and was initially investigated as a
public health issue (3,4). However, law enforcement officials
were notified and involved in the initial investigation because
of the rarity of inhalational anthrax in the United States (5,6),
because  B. anthracis has known potential as a biological
weapon (7,8), and because of increased vigilance for a possible
bioterrorist attack after the events of September 11. Once the
intentional nature of the event was made evident by the second
suspected case of inhalational anthrax in Florida, law enforce-
ment involvement increased dramatically. The receipt of an
envelope containing a threatening letter and B. anthracis at the
Hart Senate Office Building on October 15, 2001, required that
the site be handled as a crime scene, and the intial role of pub-
lic health was primarily consequence management and techni-
cal assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
other law enforcement officials.
Similarities and Differences
Although both public health and law enforcement protect
the public, the approach and nature of the work performed in
the two disciplines are quite different. The similarities and dif-
ferences in public health and law enforcement investigations
have to be understood and coordinated so that both can be
most effective (Table). Public health investigations generally
take an inductive approach. Persons are interviewed, data are
collected, hypotheses are developed to explain transmission,
and epidemiologic and laboratory studies are conducted to test
these hypotheses. If the studies confirm the hypothesis, pre-
vention and control strategies are developed, implemented,
and evaluated. All this work is held to the standard of scien-
tific peer review, generally through presentation of data at sci-
entific meetings and publication in a scientific journal. 
On the other hand, the law enforcement investigation takes
a deductive approach and is held to a very different standard.
Witnesses and potential suspects are interviewed, leads are
developed and pursued, and all available evidence is collected,
identified, and tracked. If evidence is adequate, the suspected
perpetrator is identified, arrested, and prosecuted. The work of
law enforcement is held to legal standards. Thus, while the
public health investigator’s aim is to collect data that will
withstand the scrutiny of subject matter experts and the global
scientific community, with the ultimate goal of developing
effective control measures, the law enforcement investigator’s
Figure 1. Likely flow of communication during overt bioterrorism in most
(solid line) and some (dashed line) jurisdictions. HAZMAT, hazardous
materials management personnel.
Figure 2. Likely flow of communication during covert bioterrorism in
most (solid line) and some (dashed line) jurisdictions. HAZMAT, hazard-
ous materials management personnel.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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goal is gathering evidence that will meet constitutional stan-
dards and withstand legal challenges to obtain a conviction. 
The differing nature of the work and standards to which
the work is held can pose difficulties on occasion when public
health and law enforcement officials conduct joint investiga-
tions. In high-profile investigations, such as the anthrax
attacks in 2001, these differences can be exaggerated by public
perceptions and media portrayals of public health and law-
enforcement investigative methods. The issues become even
more complex when events involve multiple geographic areas
or organizations that have overlapping responsibilities. These
difficulties can be addressed within the public health and law
enforcement communities by understanding each other’s
approaches, by communicating effectively, and by making
thoughtful preparations, including testing the system through
exercises (10–12). These measures will improve collaboration
during crises. The adage that “an emergency is a bad time to
begin exchanging business cards” applies. During the investi-
gations of the anthrax attacks in 2001, preexisting relation-
ships between FBI field offices and state and local public
health officials improved communications for field investiga-
tions and facilitated the public health response (M. Layton,
New York City Health Department, pers. comm.). 
Preexisting relationships were particularly important for
coordinating microbiologic testing of environmental and clini-
cal samples, which were critical to both investigations. Before
the 2001 anthrax incidents, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) and FBI began working together to
develop notification procedures for possible bioterrorism
events and to establish the Laboratory Response Network
(LRN) for Bioterrorism, a multilevel network connecting local
and state public health laboratories with advanced capacity
public health and military laboratories (13). The federal, state,
and local collaborative effort of law enforcement and public
health that developed the LRN is the result of predicting the
need for validated tests that would be consistent with eviden-
tiary requirements. A uniform set of laboratory protocols,
based on established procedures and reagents, facilitates the
introduction of test results into a court of law, thereby limiting
evidentiary challenges that may result from the use of different
testing methods or analyses. Because clinical specimens are
referred to LRN laboratories for analysis, the LRN also serves
as a front-line resource and detection mechanism for identify-
ing a potential covert attack. The 2001 anthrax incidents dem-
onstrated the importance of the LRN in responding to a
biological attack and revealed the need to expand its labora-
tory capacities. 
New Partnerships, New Paradigms
Although federal, state, and local public health plans for
responding to bioterrorism contributed to a state of readiness
that would not have been possible only a few years earlier, the
response to the 2001 anthrax attacks required venturing into
unfamiliar territory for many public health and law enforce-
ment officials. Historically, most terrorist attacks on Ameri-
cans have involved use of explosives (14), and investigations
have been conducted by FBI and other law enforcement agen-
cies, while public health involvement has generally been lim-
ited to ensuring safe working conditions for investigators and
aid workers and assessment of the acute and long-term physi-
cal and mental health effects (15–19). 
For many public health officials, responding to the rising
threat of bioterrorism and recent attacks has necessitated a
steep learning curve. Public health investigators usually
approach infectious disease outbreaks as naturally occurring
events, rather than the result of criminal acts, and they are
unaccustomed to working closely with law enforcement per-
sonnel (11,12). Additionally, national security clearance has
not been a requirement for most public health professionals,
for whom the clearance process is unfamiliar. During 2001,
few public health investigators had equipment such as secure
telephone and fax lines necessary for sharing sensitive infor-
mation with law enforcement officials. Confidentiality is
maintained in public health investigations for the purpose of
protecting sensitive patient medical information rather than
national security. In law enforcement, confidentiality is also
maintained to protect informants and witnesses and to preserve
the integrity of the case for prosecution. Before 2001, most
public health officials were not familiar with the principles of
maintaining the chain of custody of specimens submitted for
microbiologic testing so that laboratory results could be used
for criminal prosecution. 
Table. Differences in public health and law enforcement investigations
Characteristics Public health Law enforcement
Method of event recognition Event detected through public health surveillance or 
calls from clinicians
Event announced by attacker or is evident
Challenges to event recognition Few clinical syndromes that are clearly the result of 
bioterrorist attack; difficulty distinguishing between 
disease of natural origin and bioterrorism attack
Large number of hoaxes and noncredible threats not 
associated with an actual bioterrorist attack; delay in 
notification of possible event by public health; “copycat” 
threats or attacks (9)
Initial data collection Hypothesis generation, “shoe-leather epidemiology” Questioning of witnesses and suspects, follow-up of tips 
and intelligence information 
Confirmatory data collection and analysis Controlled epidemiologic studies Collection and organization of evidence
Data validation Presentation for scientific peer review Indictment, arrest, and conviction
Goal of investigation Effective disease prevention and control measures Prevention and deterrence of future attacksEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1155
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Collaboration with law enforcement officials generally has
not been recognized as beneficial or desirable in public health.
The presence of law enforcement officers has been thought to
compromise the collection of sensitive medical information
(e.g., illegal drug use). Indeed, some degree of separation from
law enforcement may be advantageous for obtaining complete
and accurate data during public health investigations. Public
health services are vitally needed by medically underserved
communities, where suspicion of law enforcement agencies is
intense, and collaboration with law enforcement agencies has
even been described as “destructive to public health efforts”
(20). However, the role of law enforcement in investigating
potential bioterrorism incidents requires interviewing all
potential witnesses and victims. Separate questioning by law
enforcement and public health investigators may lead to con-
flicting statements by the interviewee, jeopardizing the admis-
sibility of those statements in subsequent judicial proceedings.
A process should be established whereby joint interviews by
public health and law enforcement officials are conducted,
with opportunity for confidential communications with public
health officials regarding specific health-related issues that the
interviewee may be unwilling to share with law enforcement
personnel present. Both law enforcement and public health
must recognize that the sharing of information can be crucial
for identifying persons who have been exposed to dangerous
agents and may be in need of prevention services such as
chemoprophylaxis or vaccination.
Law enforcement is now increasingly focused on preven-
tion of terrorist acts, requiring a new partnership with the pub-
lic health and medical community. The steps necessary to
identify a potential covert bioterrorism attack include a close
coordination between those who collect and analyze medical
and syndromic surveillance information with the law-enforce-
ment community’s intelligence and case-related information.
The best method for timely detection of a covert bioterrorist
attack is early communication between the two communities
and recognition of the extent and origin of the threat. For the
FBI, this recognition requires conducting a threat/credibility
assessment, a process coordinated by the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations Unit, FBI Headquarters, in conjunc-
tion with CDC and other federal agency experts. The FBI
threat assessment is necessary to determine whether the cir-
cumstances may be the result of an intentional or criminal act,
warranting law enforcement involvement. In some cases, a
joint FBI–public health investigation is necessary to gather
facts to determine whether a criminal act has actually
occurred.
The work of CDC and FBI during the ongoing anthrax
investigation highlights the opportunity for collaboration
between public health and law enforcement. During several of
the anthrax field investigations in 2001, investigators from
FBI or local law enforcement were paired with an epidemiolo-
gist during interviews of possible case-patients and exposed
persons, which allowed a multidisciplinary approach to col-
lecting, processing, and sharing pertinent information.
Because of different training backgrounds and professional
experiences, law enforcement and public health interviewers
may recognize and note different information or clues that
could aid in identifying the source of the infection and its per-
petrator(s). Additionally, the concurrent interviews reduced
the number of times persons had to be questioned. Since Octo-
ber 12, 2001, a senior medical epidemiologist from the
National Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC, has been
assigned to FBI headquarters or to the Washington field office
to help facilitate communication of information between the
agencies and to provide on-site medical and public health con-
sultation as threats of new possible biological attacks are
assessed.
Conclusion
Partnership between public health and law enforcement is
prerequisite to sound bioterrorism planning and response.
Each group can add value to the work of the other. At the fed-
eral level, both CDC and FBI have unique perspectives and
expertise that can benefit the other. For the FBI, CDC offers
medical and laboratory consultation and collaboration com-
bined with national and international public health connec-
tions. For CDC, the FBI offers criminology expertise, forensic
laboratory collaboration, and access to intelligence informa-
tion, along with national and international law enforcement
connections. Each agency offers a unique perspective and
opportunities to share information. Similar partnerships exist
or should exist at the state and local level. Public health and
law enforcement must understand each other’s work, stan-
dards, and culture. The heat of an investigation can strain even
the best relationships. Thus, public health and law enforce-
ment need to increase mutual collaboration and understanding
before they are thrown together in the response to a biological
attack. To this end, liaison personnel are needed who have
some degree of cross-training in the public health aspects of
communicable diseases and in law enforcement and criminal
investigations. 
Dr. Butler is an infectious diseases physician and is director of the
Arctic Investigations Program, National Center for Infectious Dis-
eases in Anchorage, Alaska.  He served as the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention liaison to Federal Bureau of Investigation
headquarters during November and December 2001.
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